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CHEVRON AND DEFERENCE 
IN STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
Aaron Saiger* 
INTRODUCTION 
Chevron1 solves a multidimensional conundrum.  Whether and how 
courts should defer to agencies, when those agencies interpret the statutes 
that grant them authority to make law, is a complex constitutional puzzle.  
But any solution to that puzzle also reverberates as a matter of political 
theory, of jurisprudence, and of public administration.  Chevron‘s principle, 
that courts should defer to any reasonable interpretation by an agency of 
ambiguities in a statute that empowers it to act with the force of law,2 is 
pragmatic, responsive, and elegant with respect to bedeviling issues in each 
of these domains. 
As a matter of constitutional law, Chevron provides an account of 
congressional delegation of executive power, explicit but especially 
implicit, that is genuinely plausible and that is consistent with a genuine 
doctrine of separation of powers.3  As a matter of political theory, Chevron 
offers a workable equilibrium between the elitism of technocrats and the 
imperative for democratically accountable politics.4  As a matter of 
jurisprudence, its formula gives serious content to the principle that courts 
must say what the law is, while still assuring to agencies genuine deference, 
rather than a faux psuedo-deference by which courts defer to agencies when 
and if they agree with them.5 
From the perspective of statutory law, Chevron famously does not cite 
the federal Administrative Procedure Act6 (APA).7  But, in its structure, 
 
*  Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.  This Essay is part of a larger 
symposium entitled Chevron at 30:  Looking Back and Looking Forward.  For an overview 
of the symposium, see Peter M. Shane & Christopher J. Walker, Foreword:  Chevron at 30:  
Looking Back and Looking Forward, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 475 (2014).  I thank the 
organizers and participants in the symposium for their bracing comments and responses; my 
Fordham colleagues Nestor Davidson and Ethan Leib for additional, valuable comments; the 
Fordham Law School for financial support; and Laurence Abraham and Todd Melnick of the 
Fordham Law Library for superlative reference assistance. 
 
 1. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 2. Id. at 866. 
 3. See Emily Hammond Meazell, Presidential Control, Expertise, and the Deference 
Dilemma, 61 DUKE L.J. 1763, 1774–75 (2012). 
 4. See Frederick Liu, Chevron as a Doctrine of Hard Cases, 285 ADMIN. L.J. 285, 315–
16 (2014). 
 5. See id. at 321–23. 
 6. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012). 
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Chevron honors the APA‘s categories, or, perhaps more precisely, drinks 
from the same sources of inspiration.  Both Chevron and the federal APA 
emphasize reasonableness as the sine qua non of lawful agency action and 
the basis for judicial review. 
Finally, and not incidentally because of these features, Chevron succeeds 
as a matter of public administration.  It provides agencies with genuine 
spheres of action where they can deploy expertise and expect deference.8  It 
both creates and limits space for politics in agency decisions.  It negotiates 
between the Scylla of congressional micromanagement of statutory 
implementation and the Charybdis of ad hoc, unpredictable judicial review. 
Of course, not one of these claims for the virtue of Chevron is 
uncontested.  Much of the copious literature on the case is devoted to 
interrogating, and in some cases rejecting, the claims I mention.  Perhaps 
Chevron does not hold up with respect to a truly serious account of 
congressional intent.9  Maybe it offers no genuinely coherent articulation of 
the separation of powers.10  It arguably misapprehends executive power11 
and the APA.12  It is ―thin‖ and arguably naive in its treatment of agency 
expertise.13  It may not provide judges with a workable or enforceable 
delineation of when to review de novo and when to defer.14  One can think 
that Chevron constrains agencies too much, or not enough.15  But one of the 
key features of Chevron is its plausible claim to address the question of 
deference with respect to all of these issues at once. 
This Essay suggests some justifications for the somewhat surprising fact 
that Chevron, with its overwhelming impact upon federal administrative 
 
 7. See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy?  An 
Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 173 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 865 (2006). 
 8. See Kenneth A. Bamberger, Provisional Precedent:  Protecting Flexibility in 
Administrative Policymaking, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1272, 1290–91 (2002); Sidney Shapiro & 
Elizabeth Fisher, Chevron and the Legitimacy of “Expert” Public Administration, 22 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. REV. 465, 471–72 (2013). 
 9. See Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now:  How Chevron 
Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 779, 796 n.64 
(2010) (reviewing literature); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, 58 DUKE L.J. 549, 
554, 562 (2009); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of 
Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 517. 
 10. See Beermann, supra note 9, at 795–96 (reviewing literature); Cynthia Farina, 
Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. 
REV. 452, 466–67 (1989); Scalia, supra note 9, at 515. 
 11. See Sanford N. Caust-Ellenbogen, Blank Checks:  Restoring the Balance of Powers 
in the Post-Chevron Era, 32 B.C. L. REV. 757, 813–14 (1991); Meazell, supra note 3, at 
1775–76 & n.57 (reviewing literature); Rajiv Mohan, Chevron and the President’s Role in 
the Legislative Process, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 793, 795 (2012). But see Cass R. Sunstein, 
Beyond Marbury:  The Executive’s Power to Say What the Law Is, 115 YALE L.J. 2580, 
2582–83 (2006). 
 12. See John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 
113, 189–211 (1998); Beermann, supra note 9, at 788–90 (citing Duffy and others). 
 13. See Shapiro & Fisher, supra note 8, at 471–72, 495. 
 14. See Brian G. Slocum, The Importance of Being Ambiguous:  Substantive Canons, 
Stare Decisis, and the Central Role of Ambiguity Determinations in the Administrative State, 
69 MD. L. REV. 791, 794 (2010); see also Scalia, supra note 9, at 520–21. 
 15. See Shapiro & Fisher, supra note 8, at 478. 
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law, has not been embraced with enthusiasm or consistency in state 
administrative law.  This is true notwithstanding that state systems of 
administrative law in so many other key areas track their federal 
counterpart.16  I survey the many reasons why Chevron falls short of 
providing a useful framework for state judicial review.  The executives, 
legislatures, courts, statutes, and bureaucracies of the states are different 
from those of the federal government in ways that do not suit Chevron.  
Taken individually, these differences are not overwhelming.  They do not 
suggest that state administrative law in general should not bear a close 
family resemblance to its federal cousin.  But they are significant enough 
that the rule of deference—the Chevron rule—is a poor candidate for policy 
diffusion into other jurisdictions, including the American states. 
Ironically, the conclusion that Chevron is not the obvious model for 
deference doctrine in the states points not to a limitation of Chevron but to 
its great virtue.  Chevron simultaneously addresses several different kinds 
of administrative-law problems, each with theoretical plausibility, 
pragmatism, and deeply contextualized analysis.17   The same 
multidimensionality that makes Chevron deeply potent as federal 
administrative law doctrine, even to its detractors, makes it less likely to fit 
the (only) somewhat different context of the states.  Scholars like Evan 
Criddle, I suggest, are right to locate the ―genius‖ of Chevron in its 
―pluralistic and conciliatory‖ character.18   The Chevron rule is bespoke 
doctrine, unsuited for drag-and-drop application even into other fairly 
similar political systems precisely because it is exquisitely attuned to its 
own context. 
At the same time, Chevron‘s multivalence and contextualism are virtues 
that deserve and demand emulation by the states.  States ought to mimic 
Chevron not by adopting its holding, but by thinking about what Chevron 
thinks about:  how their legislatures operate, how their executives govern, 
how much scope their agencies have, what limits agency power, and what 
their agencies are capable of.  State judges should seek, as Chevron sought, 
to find an approach to deference that is an equilibrium characterized by 
practical wisdom and that can coherently fit with the answers to all of these 
questions. 
I.   CHEVRON IN THE STATES 
I do not undertake here to provide an updated survey of the reception of 
Chevron deference by state courts.  Several high-quality and recent surveys 
 
 16. See Arthur Earl Bonfield, The Federal APA and State Administrative Law, 72 VA. L. 
REV. 297, 303 (1986).  Bonfield notes that states did not copy federal administrative law; 
rather, the state and federal systems share common foundations. See id. at 298–99. 
 17. Evan Criddle, citing Rawls, calls this a ―pragmatic consensus.‖  Evan J. Criddle, 
Chevron’s Consensus, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1271, 1274 n.7, 1296 (2008). See also Sunstein, 
supra note 11, at 2596 (―The foundations of Chevron . . . are intensely pragmatic . . . .‖). 
 18. Criddle, supra note 17, at 1273. 
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are available.19  These surveys encounter the problem, surely unavoidable, 
that state courts‘ recital of deference rules does not seem always to reflect 
the actual nature of the deference that they provide agencies.  (This 
phenomenon is known at the federal level as well.20)  But the overall 
picture that these surveys provide is that of a ―mixed reception‖ for the 
Chevron rule in the state courts. 
Some states are at extreme ends of the spectrum.  Delaware‘s Public 
Water Supply v. DiPasquale21 is often cited as the most explicit repudiation 
of the Chevron framework in the states.  The Delaware Supreme Court 
rejects Chevron on the grounds of precedent and because ―[s]tatutory 
interpretation is ultimately the responsibility of the courts.‖22  In Delaware, 
a ―reviewing court may accord due weight, but not defer, to an agency 
interpretation of a statute administered by it.‖23  The other state that rejects 
Chevron explicitly is Michigan, which repudiates earlier cases that had 
―approvingly cited Chevron in the past‖24 for reasons similar to Delaware‘s: 
The vagaries of Chevron jurisprudence do not provide a clear road map 
for courts in this state to apply when reviewing administrative decisions.  
Moreover, the unyielding deference to agency statutory construction 
required by Chevron conflicts with . . . the separation of powers . . . by 
compelling delegation of the judiciary‘s constitutional authority to 
construe statutes to another branch of government.25 
On the other end of the spectrum are cases that adopt the Chevron rule.  
Professor Bernard Bell counts eleven states, plus the District of Columbia, 
that have adopted it explicitly.26  The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, for 
example, states that in reviewing agency interpretation of ―a statute that an 
administrative agency administers and that is within its area of expertise,‖ it 
 
 19. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 1258–61 (4th ed. 2007) (―Note on Deference to 
Agencies in the State Courts‖); William R. Andersen, Chevron in the States:  An Assessment 
and a Proposal, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 1017, 1020–30 (2006); Bernard W. Bell, The Model APA 
and the Scope of Judicial Review:  Importing Chevron into State Administrative Law, 20 
WIDENER L.J. 801, 818–22 (2010); Ann Graham, Chevron Lite:  How Much Deference 
Should Courts Give to State Agency Interpretation, 68 LA. L. REV. 1105, 1109–19 (2008); 
Michael Pappas, No Two-Stepping in the Laboratories:  State Deference Standards and 
Their Implications for Improving the Chevron Doctrine, 39 MCGEORGE L. REV. 977, 980–
1007, 1010–24 (2008). 
 20. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference:  
Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 
GEO. L.J. 1083, 1121 (2008). 
 21. 735 A.2d 378 (Del. 1999). 
 22. Id. at 382.  The opinion also notes that ―it would be anomalous for this Court to 
accord a higher level of deference to the legal rulings of an administrative agency than that 
applied to trial courts subject to our appellate jurisdiction,‖ which are reviewed de novo. Id. 
at 381.  The remaining analysis in the case focuses on Delaware precedents that address the 
question of deference. 
 23. Id. at 382. 
 24. In re Complaint of Rovas Against SBC Michigan, 754 N.W.2d 259, 271 n.63 (Mich. 
2008). 
 25. Id. at 271–72. 
 26. See Bell, supra note 19, at 818 & n.108. 
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―determine[s] first whether the statute is ambiguous.‖27  If not, the court 
does ―not defer,‖ but ―interpret[s] the statute according to its plain 
language.‖28  But ―[i]f the statute is ambiguous, we defer to the agency‘s 
interpretation, and we affirm the agency‘s interpretation unless it is 
unreasonable.‖29  ―This,‖ says the Maine Supreme Court, ―is the same two-
step analysis developed by the United States Supreme Court in Chevron.‖30  
One might argue that Maine‘s limitation of the application of this doctrine 
to statutes within the agency‘s ―area of expertise‖31 gives the doctrine more 
limited application than Chevron enjoys in federal adjudication; but the 
doctrines are at least very close.  Other states also appear to have adopted a 
doctrine that is similarly close to Chevron, but without citing the federal 
case explicitly.32 
Most of the states, however, fall between the extremes of endorsing 
Chevron and repudiating it.  Each survey of state doctrine notes a 
substantial number of states that ―defer‖ to agency determinations in the 
style of Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,33 i.e., to the extent that they are 
persuasive.  Other states titrate the level of deference to match specific 
features of the agency at issue and the question at hand.  This is similar to 
the ―continuum of deference‖34 that was given substantial momentum by 
dicta in United States v. Mead Corp.35 at the federal level.36  Broadly 
defined, this is the ―dominant view‖ among the states.37  Michael Asimow 
and his colleagues call those states that give agencies substantially less than 
full Chevron deference ―weak deference‖ states.38 
The second most common approach is roughly to track Chevron, but to 
apply it in ways that give courts somewhat more, and agencies somewhat 
less, power.  These states‘ doctrines strongly resemble Chevron but their 
courts neither cite it nor recapitulate its formulations.39  In particular, many 
 
 27. Cobb v. Bd. of Counseling Prof‘ls Licensure, 896 A.2d 271, 275 (Me. 2006). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See, e.g., Andersen, supra note 19, at 1025–26 (citing Rhode Island, Hawaii, and 
Mississippi as states that offer what ―seem to be boilerplate Chevron statements of the 
principle‖). 
 33. 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
 34. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 20, at 1090. 
 35. 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
 36. In his contribution to the symposium, Kent Barnett documents how the Congress has 
also begun to tailor the deference standard that applies in particular contexts—raising the 
question whether courts or legislatures are better situated to set the deference standard in 
particular situations. Kent Barnett, Improving Agencies’ Preemption Expertise with 
Chevmore Codification, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 587 (2014) (detailing how in the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. § 25b(5)(A) (2012), the 
Congress directed courts to review under the Skidmore standard any decision to preempt 
state law made by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency). 
 37. MICHAEL ASIMOW, ARTHUR EARL BONFIELD & RONALD M. LEVIN, STATE AND 
FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 9.2, at 563 (2d ed. 1998); see also id. at 557–58. 
 38. Id. at 557–58. 
 39. See, e.g., David E. Shipley, The Chevron Two-Step in Georgia’s Administrative Law, 
46 GA. L. REV. 871, 923 (2012) (stating that although Georgia applies a deference regime 
560 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
states do not adopt the two-step aspect of Chevron, declining to articulate 
two discrete inquiries, one de novo and one deferential.  The literature at the 
federal level demonstrates that this may or may not be a distinction without 
a difference:  Controversy swirls there regarding whether Chevron itself is 
best understood as having only one step,40 or, as some commentators on the 
state cases have also argued (with varying degrees of convincingness), 
whether the two-step structure carries doctrinal and practical significance.41 
It is also fairly common for states to articulate a doctrine similar to 
Chevron‘s but then accord deference more stingily than Chevron, honestly 
applied, seems to require.  Again, this phenomenon has a cognate in the 
federal system. 
II.   CONSTITUTIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
Why has Chevron, so dominant in federal law, found relatively little 
purchase in the states?  To the extent that Chevron is a case about 
separation of powers, delegation, and political theory—these categories are 
not easily disentangled, and for my purposes disentanglement is not 
necessary—one critical reason might be that state constitutions and their 
conceptions of separation of powers are unlike their federal counterparts.  
This part reviews the key differences between state constitutional 
institutions and the federal constitutional structure in which Chevron finds 
much of its justification.42 
A.   State Judges 
Chevron is fundamentally a judicially articulated restriction upon judicial 
power.43  In this sense it rests upon federal separation of power doctrine, 
which understands judges as apart from, and under an obligation to respect, 
the work of ―the political branches.‖44  Chevron contends that this work 
 
similar to Chevron‘s, ―there is no statement from either the Georgia Supreme Court or the 
Georgia Court of Appeals as clear as that key paragraph from Chevron announcing the 
United States Supreme Court‘s two-step approach‖). 
 40. Compare Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 
95 VA. L. REV. 597 (2009), with Kenneth A. Bamberger & Peter Strauss, Chevron’s Two 
Steps, 95 VA. L. REV. 611 (2009). See also Richard M. Re, Should Chevron Have Two 
Steps?, 89 IND. L. REV. 605, 606–08 (2014) (reviewing literature). 
 41. See, e.g., Pappas, supra note 19, at 980, 986, 995 (―[T]here is an important 
difference between Chevron, as currently practiced, and [some state courts‘] equivalent one-
step reasonableness test‖); see also Scott A. Keller, Texas Versus Chevron:  Texas 
Administrative Law on Agency Deference After Railroad Commission v. Texas Citizens, 74 
TEX. B.J. 984, 986 (2011). 
 42. Jim Rossi calls these kinds of differences ―imperfections‖ in state constitutional law, 
by which he means departures from the federal constitutional paradigm rather than errors in 
state constitutional design. See Jim Rossi, Overcoming Parochialism:  State Administrative 
Procedure and Institutional Design, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 551, 557–59 (2001) [hereinafter 
Rossi, Overcoming Parochialism]. 
 43. See Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 
WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 353 (1994). 
 44. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984) 
(quoting Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978)). 
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includes the interpretation of ambiguity.  Such interpretation often 
implicates questions of ―policy,‖ questions ―more properly addressed to 
legislators or administrators, not to judges.‖45  Federal judges ―have no 
constituency‖; for this reason they ―have a duty to respect legitimate policy 
choices made by those who do.‖46 
Chevron thus justifies its rule not only upon grounds of legislative and 
executive accountability but also of judicial nonaccountability.  It matters 
that federal judges lack a political constituency.  The combination of the 
popular accountability of the elected branches and the lack of parallel 
accountability in the judiciary justifies Chevron‘s conclusion that an 
ambiguous administrative statute is an implicit delegation of interpretative 
authority to the agency rather than a problem that ought to be solved in the 
courts.47 
Aaron-Andrew Bruhl and Ethan Leib recently offered a thorough and 
cogent argument for the proposition that state judges differ from federal 
judges in ways that potentially undermine the applicability of Chevron to 
the state context.48  The most obvious difference, they suggest, is that state 
judges are not appointed for life.49  State arrangements are all over the map:  
some judges in some states are elected, some appointed but subject to 
reappointment, some appointed but subject to retention elections, some 
appointed for fixed terms, and some subject to mandatory retirement.50  
Judges subject to such arrangements in an important sense do have political 
constituencies.  If judges face an electorate, or if their tenure is subject to 
retention decisions by elected officials, they are in an important sense 
―political creatures.‖51  As Bruhl and Leib point out, this means that the 
courts on which they sit are in an important sense ―political branches.‖52 
Bruhl and Leib‘s argument goes beyond the simple observation that 
elected judges are politicians because they are elected.  Elections do more 
than make state judges democratically accountable; they also make them 
politically attuned and politically connected.  By virtue of elections and set 
terms, they are closer to the public than federal judges; by virtue of the 
 
 45. Id. at 864. 
 46. Id. at 866. 
 47. See Sunstein, supra note 11, at 2586. 
 48. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl & Ethan J. Leib, Elected Judges and Statutory 
Interpretation, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1215, 1249–54, 1277–82 (2012). 
 49. Id. at 1250. 
 50. See LARRY BERKSON, SCOTT BELLER & MICHELE GRIMALDI, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN 
THE UNITED STATES:  A COMPENDIUM OF PROVISIONS 6 (1980) (―Today there is an almost 
endless combination of schemes used to select judges.  Almost no two states are alike . . . .‖); 
Joseph A. Colquitta, Rethinking Judicial Nominating Commissions:  Independence, 
Accountability, and Public Support, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 73, 73, 77 (2007); F. Andrew 
Hanssen, The Effect of Judicial Institutions on Uncertainty and the Rate of Litigation:  The 
Election Versus Appointment of State Judges, 28 J.L. STUD. 205, 211 (1999); Lawrence 
Schlam, State Constitutional Amending, Independent Interpretation, and Political Culture:  
A Case Study in Constitutional Stagnation, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 269, 293 & n.60 (1994). 
 51. Bruhl & Leib, supra note 48, at 1253. 
 52. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 838 (1984); 
see Bruhl & Leib, supra note 48, at 1249. 
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political nature of their office they are also closer to the legislature.53  State 
judges are thus potentially, in at least some important contexts, differently 
situated than federal judges with respect to understanding and interpreting 
statutes that grant agencies power.54  All of these factors weaken the case 
that state judges are like federal judges with respect to the need to cede 
―policy‖ determination to other branches. 
Professor Bernard Bell likewise notes that various aspects of state court 
jurisdiction make state judges more like policymakers than their federal 
counterparts.55  State courts have the general jurisdiction to develop the 
common law.56  They may render advisory opinions.57  They have generous 
standing and justiciability rules.58 
What is to be made of these differences?  One possibility is that elected 
judges, both more politically attuned and more politically vulnerable than 
their appointed counterparts, might be particularly activist with respect to 
judicial review.  Where an appointed judge sticks to the law, an elected 
judge might, like any other politician, more readily seek to give expression 
to ―policy‖ views.  At the extreme, the elected judge may find herself 
beholden to or even ―controlled‖ by special interests or political 
machines.59 
F. Andrew Hanssen, by contrast, hypothesizes the converse, that 
appointed judges can oversee agencies with ―greater impunity‖ than elected 
ones.60  He suggests that ―appointed courts may be expected to be less 
influenced by the political/electoral forces that underlie the policy decisions 
of administrative agencies (at least to a degree), and, accordingly, to be 
more threatening to agency decisions.‖61 
William Funk, and Bell after him, suggests the third possibility that 
elected and appointed judges are not situated differently with respect to 
judicial review.62  In Funk‘s words: 
The fact that many state judges are subject to the electoral process also 
seems irrelevant to their suitability to review the rationality of state 
agency rulemaking.  Or at least it is no more relevant to their suitability to 
 
 53. See Bruhl & Leib, supra note 48, at 1250–54.  Abbe Gluck extends this observation 
to state judges in general, regardless whether they are elected. See Abbe R. Gluck, The States 
As Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation:  Methodological Consensus and the New 
Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1816 (2010). 
 54. But see William Funk, Rationality Review of State Administrative Rulemaking, 43 
ADMIN. L. REV. 147, 161 n.95 (1991) (―In many states . . . judges are elected or subject to 
reelection, but no one has suggested that courts are intended to be politically responsive in 
these states.‖). 
 55. Bell, supra note 19, at 824–25. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 825. 
 58. Id. at 825–26. 
 59. BERKSON, BELLER & GRIMALDI, supra note 50, at 4. 
 60. F. Andrew Hanssen, Independent Courts and Administrative Agencies:  An 
Empirical Analysis of the States, 16 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 534, 538 (2000). 
 61. Id. at 535.  Hanssen tests this hypothesis by looking for correlations between judicial 
elections and agency staffing levels for agencies subject to litigation. See id. at 535–36. 
 62. See Bell, supra note 19, at 827–28; Funk, supra note 54, at 174–75. 
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engage in rationality review of rulemaking than it is to their suitability to 
engage in any other form of judicial activity.63 
Finally, Bruhl and Leib, for their part, understand institutional variation 
in state judiciaries to imply ―that one has to embrace nuance when thinking 
about when deference is indicated in the state courts.‖64  They do not claim 
that Chevron is never appropriate in the state context.  Nor do the authors 
mean by ―nuance‖ just that one might adopt different modes of deference 
depending upon the constitutional structure of a state judiciary, whether it is 
elected or appointed, term-limited or not.  Bruhl and Leib mean nuance:  
that the regime of judicial deference should depend upon the kind of 
electoral accountability a particular court faces.  Judicial elections, they 
suggest, create too many different kinds of situations for a rule like Chevron 
to have broad applicability. 
From a positive perspective, scholars have been unable to demonstrate a 
clear relationship between variables related to the election and retention of 
state judges and their decisions in cases involving the executive branch.65  
The ―somewhat mixed‖66 empirical results are consistent both with the 
possibility that judicial election and appointment do not matter and the 
possibility that nuance, which this sort of analysis cannot capture, rules the 
day. 
But, of course, nuance and Chevron are uneasy bedfellows.  Bruhl and 
Leib use the electability of judges as an argument for the ―continuum of 
deference,‖67 identified at the federal level with Mead.68  And although 
Mead does not repudiate Chevron, this continuum is at odds with the 
Chevron idea that structural principles dictate a one-size-fits-all deference 
regime.  Justice Scalia, dissenting in Mead, is Chevron‘s great champion 
because he rejects a continuum of deference.  To ―tailor deference to 
variety‖69 is to limit, not to endorse, the scope of Chevron. 
B.   State Executives 
Chevron also rests heavily upon the relationship between the legislature 
and the executive, and the accountability of agencies to the latter.  Judicial 
acquiescence to reasonable agency interpretation is appropriate, Chevron 
tells us, because unlike judges, 
an agency to which Congress has delegated policy-making responsibilities 
may, within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the 
 
 63. Funk, supra note 54, at 174–75. 
 64. Bruhl & Leib, supra note 48, at 1279 & n.245. 
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incumbent administration‘s views of wise policy to inform its judgments.  
While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief 
Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the 
Government to make such policy choices—resolving the competing 
interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or 
intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged with the 
administration of the statute . . . .70 
This statement justifiably has been the source of considerable 
controversy.  It troublingly and casually conflates the President, the 
―administration,‖ and the agencies.71  Even more problematically, it seems 
to assume routine, hierarchical control by the first two over the third.  But, 
holding aside whether Chevron properly describes the presidency and its 
relationship to the agencies, it seems incontrovertible that federal agencies 
are embedded in some fashion in the executive branch, in ways that create 
political accountability that is more direct than that of federal courts.  
Federal agency heads are clearly subject to the political supervision of the 
President or his ―administration‖ in some fashion:  they face presidential 
appointment, the requirements of the Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs (OIRA), and, for line agencies, the possibility of presidential 
removal.   
All three of these institutional structures—appointment, review, and 
removal—exist in the states.72  But the structural and institutional context 
of the states is not Washington‘s.  The assumption of hierarchical control in 
particular is even more implausible with respect to the states than it is with 
respect to the federal government.  ―Despite numerous state 
reorganizations,‖ Jeffrey Brudney and F. Ted Hebert report, state executive 
branches are ―not hierarchical organization[s] yielding to classical 
management principles with the governor securely in control.  In fact, great 
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variation distinguishes the degree to which agencies are subordinate—
formally or informally—to the governor.‖73 
In the executive sphere, the primary structural difference is that most 
states have plural, rather than unitary, executives.  Christopher Berry and 
Jacob Gersen have documented the extraordinary extent of plural executive 
arrangements across the states.  These institutions are startling both because 
of the number of elected statewide officials and the apparent trend in favor 
of what Berry and Gersen call executive ―unbundling.‖74  In 2002, they 
report, governors and lieutenant governors were elected independently of 
one another in forty-five states.75  Treasurers and secretaries of state were 
elected independently in thirty-eight.76  Berry and Gersen identified more 
than five states that, variously, use direct election for the chief executives of 
state agencies that govern auditing, education, agriculture, insurance, 
utilities, community affairs, and finance.77  In the states, then, agencies in 
some spheres are directly accountable to the people, and the governor, in 
those spheres, is not.78 
This need not undermine Chevron-style deference.  Funk argues, for 
example, that the popular election of agency heads should not be relevant to 
the doctrine of judicial review.  Such agencies are still engaged in 
rulemaking and administrative adjudication, not in legislation, much as 
popularly elected judges are engaged in adjudication notwithstanding 
election.  Instead, agency action should be reviewed under the assumption 
that administrative rather than legislative norms govern its production.79 
Indeed, one might make an even stronger argument.  As Berry and 
Gersen have argued, if particular agency heads are subject to direct public 
election, there is every reason to think that policy in the domain belonging 
to that agency will be determined in closer accordance with popular will 
than it would be were that agency subordinated to a ―general purpose‖ chief 
executive.80  An entire layer of principal-agent problems is avoided.81  On 
this argument, perhaps Chevron applies a fortiori to agencies directly 
elected and directly accountable to the people:  when the legislature 
delegates authority to such an agency, and legislative authority proves to 
have explicit or implicit gaps, the agency‘s direct accountability provides an 
especially strong argument for presuming that those gaps constitute a 
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delegation of law-determining power to that agency, within the bounds of 
reasonableness. 
But it is more complicated than that.  For one thing, election is not the 
same thing as accountability.  Like special-purpose local governments and 
single-topic congressional committees, a state agency with an elected head 
likely is less politically salient than a general-purpose executive—a 
governor or lieutenant governor.  Elections for special-purpose state 
officials are substantially less vivid and relevant to their electorates than 
national politics (although there are dramatic exceptions82).  When Chevron 
refers to the political accountability of the ―Chief Executive,‖83 it 
contemplates an executive, the President, whose name everyone knows.  
Likewise, the state-level electorate is familiar with its governor, and blames 
him for things it does not like.  This is true even if credit and blame 
properly belong to the elected state insurance or agriculture commissioner, 
persons unknown to almost everyone.84  For the same reasons, the special-
purpose elected state official seems to be a prime candidate for capture by 
special interests.85 
Second, plural executive arrangements give rise to various kinds of 
intraexecutive checks.  Of particular interest are state attorneys general, 
who are elected, rather than appointed by governors, in forty-three states.86  
Scott M. Matheson, Jr. notes that in some states ―the attorney general has 
the exclusive constitutional authority to employ and supervise all lawyers 
involved in legal matters for executive agencies of state government, 
including the lawyers for other elected executive branch officials.‖87  This 
might allow an attorney general‘s interpretation of the law to trump that of 
both the governor and the agency head.  At a minimum ―the problem of 
deadlock and frustration of executive branch mission is a real possibility,‖ 
especially, Matheson adds, when there are partisan differences.88 
In addition, in many (but not all) states, attorneys general may and do 
bring suit against other elected executive officials, at least in cases of 
potential unconstitutionally.89  William Marshall outlines an argument that 
attorneys general are not supposed to substitute their policy judgment for 
that of agencies but are supposed to exercise independent legal judgment.90  
This argument is especially strong, Marshall suggests, when attorneys 
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general sue another entity within the ―executive branch for exceeding its 
authority.‖91  Such suits, of course, are quintessential Chevron analogs. 
In accordance with Marshall‘s ―structural‖ argument, and on one reading 
of Chevron, attorneys general are exercising their own brand of Chevron 
deference.  Chevron tells courts to defer to agencies making ―policy choices 
[] resolving . . . competing interests,‖92 and the structural argument tells 
attorneys general to do the same thing.  But of course Chevron understands 
the ―policy choices‖ to which it refers to be instantiated as interpretations of 
the law; and, as Marshall argues, the law is the proper subject for the 
attorney general‘s independent judgment.  In that respect, the state attorney 
general is a Chevron-confounding figure.  He or she constitutes a second 
source within the politically accountable executive that independently 
determines what the law is in the case of a legislative gap. 
The potential such arrangements create for intraexecutive conflicts can 
push judicial deference in a variety of conflicting directions.  On the one 
hand, the plural executive is a mechanism for checking and balancing 
unitary executive power.  Judicial review, which is also supposed to check 
that power, might therefore feel itself able to be quite deferential, because 
its check is less vital.  If the attorney general and an agency agree, perhaps 
state courts should provide full Chevron-style deference, or be even more 
deferential.  But if they disagree, Chevron provides little guidance:  Should 
one defer to the expert agency, as Chevron urges, or the more accountable 
state attorney general, as Chevron also urges?  In cases of disagreement, 
moreover, and perhaps some cases of agreement as well, multiple 
executives ―will have powerful incentives to blur accountability by blurring 
the distinctions between their own power and the power of their 
coexecutive colleagues.‖93  Indeed, plural executives make it difficult to 
assign responsibility regardless whether such blurring is desired.94 
And what of an expert agency whose chief is directly elected, rather than 
subordinate to the governor?  A state-elected education or insurance 
commissioner, in conflict with an attorney general or governor or both, is 
both accountable (because she is elected) and expert (because she is an 
agency with a particular policy portfolio).  But the cases for both her 
accountability and her expertise could potentially be quite weak.  She might 
be elected in a low-salience or very low-salience election, much less 
accountable than the attorney general or governor with whom she is at odds.  
And she might also be, in part because of the fact of her election, inexpert 
as well; certainly she could well be less expert than the technocratic 
bureaucracies that Chevron postulates are working in the federal context. 
As with the state judiciary, therefore, we come to a position of doubt with 
respect to the Chevron framework as applied to the state executive.  There 
will surely be states, and particular categories of institutional and factual 
circumstances within those states, where Chevron‘s arguments about 
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executive accountability seem as apropos as they do in the federal system.  
But there will surely be many others where they seem much more 
inapposite than they do in the federal system.  The appeal of Chevron as a 
general principle, then, fades in the face of the widespread phenomenon of 
the plural state executive and intraexecutive conflict. 
C.   State Legislatures 
Chevron‘s principal structural justification for its deference rule is that 
gaps in agency-empowering legislation constitute a ―legislative delegation 
to an agency on a particular question.‖95  The cognate state institution, the 
state legislature, is therefore critical with respect to the applicability of 
Chevron deference.  In particular, Chevron‘s innovation was to discern in 
legislative gaps ―implicit‖ delegations that paralleled explicit ones.  Both 
are ―delegations.‖  It is therefore important to consider whether state 
legislatures, regardless whether the gaps they leave are implicit or explicit, 
plausibly can be thought to be ―delegating‖ power to agencies in the same 
sense as does the Congress of the United States. 
There is some reason to think so.  Of the three branches of government, 
state legislatures are structurally most like their federal counterparts.  All 
but one state legislature is bicameral.96  All state legislatures, like the 
Congress, enact legislation that undertakes to guide agency action.97  
Institutions like committees, markup, and reconciliation, though they often 
differ in their details and in their effectiveness, are common across states 
and the federal system.98 
But there are differences that are arguably relevant.  Perhaps the most 
important is the peculiar insistence in the federal courts upon the principle 
that the Congress may not delegate any legislative power to agencies 
(―nondelegation‖).99  But, in federal law, authorizations to adjudicate or to 
make rules that guide agency discretion are legitimate delegations of 
executive power, rather than illegitimate ones of legislative power, so long 
as the agency‘s discretion is cabined by an ―intelligible principle.‖100  The 
requirement of intelligibility in the United States Supreme Court is quite 
undemanding.101 
As Jim Rossi has exhaustively documented, this is not the rule of 
delegation in the states.102  Rossi finds states that locate themselves on both 
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sides of the federal doctrine.  A handful of state courts will bless even 
agency delegations that contain no substantive restrictions upon agency 
discretion, so long as procedural safeguards are in place.103  A much larger 
group is less tolerant of legislative delegation than federal law.  Some of 
these put teeth into the concept of intelligibility not present in the federal 
doctrine.104  Others understand the power to set the broad outlines of 
important policies to be legislative, and nondelegable, even if the legislature 
offers the agency some intelligible guide to the exercise of its discretion.105 
If we understand Chevron‘s idea of implicit delegation in the context of 
federal nondelegation doctrine,106 then the implications of state 
nondelegation doctrine for Chevron review could be substantial.  The 
―implicit‖ delegation by the Congress to the agency that Chevron sees in 
the passage of an ambiguous act that does not ―directly‖ speak ―to the 
precise question at issue‖107 sets up statutory ambiguity.  This ambiguity, 
which limns the boundaries of reasonableness in the Step-Two inquiry, 
validates the delegation.108  If an ambiguous grant of authority is written to 
make more than one but not every possible agency interpretation of its 
authority reasonable, then its principle is intelligible. 
But if a particular state does not require the presence of an intelligible 
principle for delegation, then the presence of an ambiguity less plausibly 
indicates that the legislature intended, by the fact of ambiguity, such a 
delegation.  Similarly, if a particular state requires more than the presence 
of an intelligible principle for licit delegation, the mere fact of ambiguity 
again seems a less convincing basis upon which to imply a delegation.  In 
both kinds of states—together, easily most states—the Chevron 
presumption that ambiguity constitutes delegation seems weak.  Ambiguity 
in these states seems rather to be just ambiguity:  a statement of the law that 
will eventually require someone to declare what the law is.  Without the 
delegation argument, it becomes more plausible that this someone should be 
a court reviewing de novo. 
This argument is further buttressed by other structural differences 
between the Congress and many state legislatures.  State legislatures have 
general jurisdiction; unlike the Congress, they may legislate about virtually 
any topic not preempted by federal law.109  The scope of potential 
delegation is therefore much greater in the state than in the federal 
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legislature.  General jurisdiction is likely one reason for more rigorous 
nondelegation doctrine in the states.  Similar considerations could lead to 
the conclusion that one ought to be hesitant to infer delegation by state 
legislatures from the mere fact of statutory ambiguity. 
In other work, Jim Rossi has also noted other, less substantial but still 
salient differences between the Congress and the legislatures.  Legislatures, 
often pursuant to constitutional provisions, meet infrequently.110  In some 
states serving as a legislator is a part-time job and legislative staffs are less 
developed.111  Infrequent sessions, high turnover, and limited staff, argues 
Rossi, mean less internal expertise, a greater scope for lobbyists, and, 
overall ―decreased legislative accountability.‖112  State legislatures are also 
less in a position to oversee agency activity through staff work and 
oversight hearings, which are ubiquitous management devices at the federal 
level.113  All of these factors suggest that there is less reason at the state 
than at the federal level to see in an ambiguous statute a legislative intent to 
delegate power to agencies. 
III.   STATUTES GOVERNING REVIEW OF AGENCY ACTION 
Chevron famously does not cite the Administrative Procedure Act.114  
Nor by any means do the provisions of the APA imply or require Chevron 
(or any other) kind of deference to agencies‘ statutory interpretations.  
Indeed, some scholars argue that Chevron contravenes the APA, which they 
understand to require courts to review agencies‘ legal interpretations de 
novo.115 
An opposing view understands Chevron to be careful to align itself with 
statutory principles of judicial review.  Chevron begins with the principle 
that courts must give agency constructions pursuant to explicit delegation of 
executive power ―controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or 
manifestly contrary to the statute.‖116  It then extends this principle to 
implicit delegations.  In doing so, Chevron cites to Court precedent—not to 
the APA—but its language parallels117 the APA requirement that reviewing 
courts ―hold unlawful and set aside agency action‖ that is found to be 
―arbitrary, capricious, . . . or otherwise not in accordance with law.‖118  The 
APA does not mandate deference to agencies‘ legal interpretations; it is 
consistent with the statute for courts to determine de novo what is or is not 
―in accordance with law.‖  But Chevron‘s is nonetheless an APA-
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compatible framework for evaluating such interpretations, one that is 
consistent with, and fits cleanly into, the APA‘s conceptual framework for 
judicial review. 
Regardless which of these views one accepts, Chevron fits less neatly 
into the framework of state-level Administrative Procedure Acts (SLAPAs) 
than into that of the federal APA.  This is true in two major respects.119  
First, Chevron tracks SLAPA language regarding judicial review, which is 
itself variable, less cleanly than it does federal language.  Second, most 
states establish by statute, along with executive order, mechanisms for the 
review of agency rules by legislatures and governors as well as by courts.  
The review of agency action by nonjudicial actors perforce carries 
implications for review conducted by judges. 
A.   Statutory Language Regarding Judicial Review 
The 2010 Model State Administrative Procedure Act (MSAPA) directs 
courts to provide relief if ―agency action is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.‖120  A separate, 
independent, and prior provision also directs courts to provide relief if ―the 
agency erroneously interpreted the law.‖121  These provisions together 
parallel the federal APA more closely than did the earlier, 1981 version of 
the Model State APA, which directed state courts to set aside agency action 
that was ―outside the range of discretion delegated to the agency by any 
provision of law‖ and, in brackets, also suggested that state courts set aside 
agency action ―otherwise unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious.‖122  ―The 
brackets,‖ explained Professor William Funk in 1991, ―indicate the 
Uniform Law Commissioners‘ intent to provide an option between a 
broader and more limited judicial role in review of agency action.‖123 
The current Model Act, in elevating the familiar arbitrary and capricious 
standard to a more central position, is perhaps somewhat less catholic than 
previous versions of the Act with respect to this question; by paralleling 
federal language it can fairly be said to have moved in the direction of 
Chevron-style deference.  But this is at most a small change.124  The current 
Model Act, like its predecessor, remains determinedly and purposefully 
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unwilling to endorse Chevron deference.125  The drafters comment that the 
―arbitrary, capricious, . . . or otherwise not in accordance with law‖ 
provision ―is not intended to preclude courts from according deference to 
agency interpretations of law, where such deference is appropriate.‖126  
However, they also cite approvingly William Araiza‘s view that the 
―[j]udiciary, not [the] legislature, [is the] appropriate body to evolve 
specific standards for review, because of [the] great variety of agency action 
and contexts.‖127  In addition, the introduction to the 2010 Act, after noting 
that ―[m]ost states have a substantial body of judicial review case law,‖ 
states that its ―provisions are designed to be consistent with the existing 
laws of many states that take a variety of approaches to judicial review.‖128  
Moreover, the separate provision requiring relief in the case of erroneous 
agency interpretation remains.  By separating law-interpretation cases from 
other kinds of agency action, the Model Act leaves plenty of room for 
separate standards. 
Michael Pappas‘s discussion of deference demonstrates both that state 
courts appear to be concerned that their regimes of deference be 
conceptually consistent with SLAPA requirements129 and that not all 
SLAPAs bear as much of a family resemblance to the federal Act as the 
MSAPA.130  For example, he argues that Public Water Supply Co. v. 
DiPasquale,131 the Delaware case that repudiates Chevron in favor of de 
novo review, is rooted in the Delaware SLAPA.  De novo review is not 
compelled by that state act, which is silent with respect to standards of 
deference to agencies‘ statutory interpretation.132  But the Delaware Act 
combines that silence with a requirement that courts defer to agencies‘ 
factual findings,133 which suggests an expressio unius argument that 
deference should not be accorded to the former.  Moreover, the Delaware 
Act requires agencies reviewing regulations to ―take due account of the 
experience and specialized competence of the agency and of the purposes of 
the basic law under which the agency acted.‖134  This can be read to suggest 
that (a) inquiry as to legal meaning must precede the consideration of 
agency action, and (b) Chevron‘s blanket deference to agencies by virtue of 
their institutional identity as agencies making decisions that carry the force 
of law is not what the framers of the Delaware Act had in mind. 
Another way in which SLAPAs address the deference problem is by 
instructing agencies to read their authorizing statutes narrowly.  Professor 
Bell cites the excellent examples of the Colorado and Florida SLAPAs.  
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The Colorado statute states that ―[n]o rule shall be issued except within the 
power delegated to the agency and as authorized by law,‖ and explicitly 
adds that a ―rule shall not be deemed to be within the statutory authority 
and jurisdiction of any agency merely because such rule is not contrary to 
the specific provisions of a statute.‖135  Florida‘s statute states that 
[a]n agency may adopt only rules that implement or interpret the specific 
powers and duties granted by the enabling statute.  No agency shall have 
authority to adopt a rule only because it is reasonably related to the 
purpose of the enabling legislation and is not arbitrary and capricious or is 
within the agency‘s class of powers and duties, nor shall an agency have 
the authority to implement statutory provisions setting forth general 
legislative intent or policy.136 
These statutes and cognate provisions in other states do not reject 
Chevron.  Rather, they are provisions that guide statutory interpretation by 
agencies.  Just as Chevron itself instructs the federal courts to address Step 
One problems using ―the traditional tools of statutory construction,‖137 
agencies faithful to the textualist instructions of the Colorado or Florida 
legislatures could still encounter ambiguities permitting multiple 
interpretations, and courts could still then defer to their reasonable choices 
among those interpretations.  But these sorts of statutes surely do restrict the 
potential reach of any state-level doctrine cognate to Chevron.138  This is 
surely true if state agencies and legislatures would otherwise have inclined 
toward more capacious and flexible methods of statutory interpretation, but 
even, I think, if both are strict textualists. 
Strikingly, Pappas concludes that the judicial review provisions of 
SLAPAs have little effect upon state deference standards; because they are 
silent as to this question, courts establish deference rules based upon their 
own jurisprudential preferences.139  Pappas sees in this a parallel to the 
federal situation, whereby Chevron is not required by nor based upon the 
federal APA.140  But this is a failure to recognize the sense in which 
Chevron accommodates, echoes, and matches, even though it does not rely 
upon, the federal statute.  States seeking a similar congruence between their 
deference standards and their SLAPA will not all find Chevron as good a 
fit. 
A further complication arises in those states that make direct 
constitutional provision for judicial review of agency action.  Chevron itself 
is judge-made and legislation-influenced doctrine; the United States 
Constitution says little about agencies and nothing specific about judicial 
review.  Indeed, fitting the modern regulatory state into a constitution silent 
on the subject has been the central preoccupation of federal administrative 
 
 135. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-4-103(8)(a) (2013) (cited in Bell, supra note 19, at 838). 
 136. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.536(1) (West 2008) (cited in Bell, supra note 19, at 838–39). 
 137. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 
(1984). 
 138. Bell, supra note 19, at 839 & n.201. 
 139. Pappas, supra note 19, at 1008. 
 140. Id. 
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law and one in which Chevron has played a substantial part.  Some state 
constitutions, however, are not silent with respect to agencies or to judicial 
review.  The Michigan Constitution, for example, specifically provides that 
―[a]ll final decisions, findings, rulings and orders of any administrative 
officer or agency existing under the constitution or by law . . . shall be 
subject to direct review by the courts as provided by law.‖141  The Missouri 
Constitution is similar.142 
The Michigan Supreme Court relies upon this constitutionalization of 
judicial review in rejecting a Chevron-style framework, holding that this 
passage assumes the general judicial power expressed elsewhere in the 
document.143  This argument is strong.  The concepts of the judicial power 
and of judicial review that appear in and are derived from the United States 
Constitution assume a context very different from that of the regulatory 
state.  But the state constitutions, many recently revised, should be read to 
assume a regulatory state.  If those documents set out a right of judicial 
review, there is reason to think that they imagine courts reviewing agency 
interpretations of law de novo. 
B.   Agency Rules Review 
Most states allow political officials to modify or rescind agency rules 
before they become effective.144  The most common device is to provide 
statutorily for legislative review, either by full legislatures or by committees 
or commissions within the legislatures.145  Less frequently, governors are 
given power to review rules.146  A few states have hybrid institutional 
arrangements.147  The states also vary widely in the powers, criteria, and 
timetables associated with rules review.148  These arrangements may be 
purely statutory or pursuant to constitutional authorization.149 
 
 141. MICH. CONST. art.  6, § 28. 
 142. MO. CONST. art. 5, § 18 (stating that agency action is subject to ―direct review by the 
courts as provided by law‖ and that ―such review shall include the determination whether the 
same [is] authorized by law‖); see also S.C. CONST. art. 1, § 22 (establishing a right of 
judicial review of agency action, without specifying the content of that right). 
 143. See In re Complaint of Rovas Against SBC Michigan, 754 N.W.2d 259, 265–67 
(Mich. 2008). 
 144. Neal D. Woods, Political Influence on Agency Rule Making:  Examining the Effects 
of Legislative and Gubernatorial Rule Review Powers, 36 ST. & LOC. GOV‘T REV. 174, 174 
(2004). 
 145. Rossi, Institutional Design, supra note 102, at 1201. 
 146. See, e.g., infra notes 147, 169, 173–74 and accompanying text. 
 147. See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 28-9-106 (2013) (providing for approval by a council 
which must then be ratified by the governor). 
 148. See Dennis O. Grady & Kathleen M. Simon, Political Restraints and Bureaucratic 
Discretion:  The Case of State Government Rule Making, 30 POL. & POL‘Y 646, 649–54 
(2002) (presenting a fifty-state survey documenting variation in practices of rules review); 
Robert W. Hahn, State and Federal Regulatory Reform:  A Comparative Analysis, 29 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 873, 875–81 (2000); Woods, supra note 144, at 175–77 & tbls.1–2 (using data 
collected by Grady and Simon to develop a summary measure of political influence over 
state rulemaking, by state). 
 149. See, e.g., NEV. CONST. art. 3, § 1(2) (authorizing legislature to ―provide by law‖ for 
legislative review of agency action and the nullification of regulations by legislative action); 
N.J. CONST. art. 5, § 4, ¶ 6 (similar). 
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All rules review regimes—by empowering political branches to review, 
approve, modify or reject agency rules—clearly have implications for 
judicial review of such rules, and therefore for judicial deference.  The 
provisions for legislative review in the 2010 MSAPA,150 for example, 
empower a legislative ―rules review committee‖ to review all newly 
adopted rules and all existing rules to determine whether the rule is a ―valid 
exercise of delegated legislative authority‖151 that is ―necessary to 
accomplish the apparent or expressed intent of the specific statute that the 
rule implements,‖152 and ―a reasonable implementation of the law.‖153  The 
parallels to judicial review are striking. 
One obvious problem relating to legislative rules review is its possible 
unconstitutionality.  Cognate arrangements at the federal level would be 
clearly invalid under INS v. Chadha.154  As Jim Rossi has documented, the 
Chadha analysis also has had, appropriately, significant purchase in many 
states.155  Indeed, Rossi argues that for constitutional reasons ―the future of 
legislative rules review—particularly where there is a veto and the state has 
no explicit constitutional authorization—is bleak.‖156  But, where 
constitutional challenges have yet to be brought or are unsuccessful, 
legislative review of rules matters institutionally when considering judicial 
deference.  As a matter of doctrine, the empowerment of the legislature to 
approve, rescind, or modify rules reduces the plausibility of the Chevron 
assumption that legislatures intend to delegate the law-interpretation 
function to agencies.  As a matter of politics, rules review changes the 
position of the judiciary in the separation of powers game that otherwise 
characterizes judicial review of rules.157 
Neither of these conclusions is self-evident.  In the federal context, 
whether an agency action gets Chevron deference, no deference, or 
deference of some other kind, the Congress always can revoke or modify 
any (prospective) agency action, by passing new legislation.  That the 
Congress retains the power to override agency action with which it 
disagrees is among the justifications for Chevron‘s idea of deferring to 
agency interpretation of the statute.  Should the legislature object to an 
agency interpretation, it can set it aside.  With respect to legislative power, 
rules review does not seem terribly different from this arrangement, 
especially if rescission or modification pursuant to that review requires 
 
 150. The MSAPA drafters comment that the legislative rules review committee is a model 
―widely followed in state administrative law.‖ REVISED MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE 
ACT § 702 cmt. (2010); accord Woods, supra note 144, at 175. 
 151. REVISED MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT § 702(b)(1) (2010). 
 152. Id. § 702(b)(3). 
 153. Id. § 702(b)(4). 
 154. 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
 155. Rossi, Institutional Design, supra note 102, at 1203–16. 
 156. Id. at 1212; see also REVISED MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT § 703 cmt. 
(2010) (discussing ways to avoid Chadha problems in enacting systems for rules review). 
 157. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures As Politics in Administrative Law, 107 
COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1752 (2007); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, 
Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523, 540–41 (1992). 
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bicameralism and presentment to the governor, which it often does.158  (To 
the extent that it does not, the constitutional deficiencies of the review 
statute become correspondingly more severe.159) 
It has long been understood, however, that legislatures rarely legislate in 
order to repeal or revise interpretations delegated to agencies, even when 
agencies depart from a previous statute‘s intent, however defined.160  It is in 
light of this disability that legislatures rely upon administrative process; 
―procedures allow politicians to prevent deviations before they occur.‖161  
One feature of such procedure at the federal level is that agencies work on 
what McCubbins, Noll and Weingast call ―autopilot‖:  legislators need not 
revisit, and indeed both hope and expect not to revisit, agency decisions.162  
This is why Chadha matters.163  When states provide for legislative rules 
review, agencies therefore become more ―permeable‖ to political 
influence.164  Their rules are on the quotidian agenda of the sitting 
legislative review committee.  That committee and its parent legislature are 
expected routinely to give effect to their own preferences with respect to 
agency action post facto, and they enjoy the benefit of existing procedures, 
political norms, bureaucratic routines, resources, staff, and expertise in 
doing so.  The circumstances of a legislature that has created such 
procedures seem very different than the autopilot circumstances under 
which Chevron assumes that the legislature has delegated to an agency the 
task of construing ambiguity.165  The legislature expects to review and to 
approve not only the text going into the statute books but also the 
interpretations that come out.  Such a legislature asks an interpreting agency 
to opine as to the meaning of the statute, but not to decide it authoritatively. 
Legislation authorizing rulemaking, moreover, is a complex and 
multistage game.  Some controversy has attached to the claim, advocated by 
McCubbins and his colleagues, that much of federal administrative 
procedure serves to entrench the policies of enacting coalitions.166  This 
argument suggests that federal law, by favoring procedures adopted by 
enacting coalitions and subjecting results under those procedures only to a 
legislative veto that is cumbersome, uncertain, and rare, favors the 
 
 158. See REVISED MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT § 703 & cmt. (2010); see also 
H. Harold Levinson, Legislative and Executive Veto of Rules of Administrative Agencies:  
Models and Alternatives, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 79, 82–84 (1982). 
 159. See Blank v. Dep‘t of Corr., 611 N.W.2d 530, 538–39 (Mich. 2000); REVISED 
MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT § 703 cmt. (2010); Woods, supra note 144, at 174. 
 160. Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Structure and 
Process, Politics and Policy:  Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of 
Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 441 (1989). 
 161. Id. at 442. 
 162. See id. at 444.  McCubbins and his colleagues mean something more specialized by 
―autopilot,‖ but the general observation holds as well. 
 163. Sarah J. Poggione & Christopher Reenock, Political Insulation and Legislative 
Interventions:  The Impact of Rule Review, 9 ST. POL. & POL‘Y Q. 456, 460 (2009). 
 164. Id. at 461, 466; accord Woods, supra note 144, at 174 (rules review gives state 
legislatures ―additional leverage‖ over agency outcomes). 
 165. See Poggione & Reenock, supra note 163, at 460–62. 
 166. For a review, see Steven J. Balla, Procedures and Political Control of the 
Bureaucracy, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 663, 664 (1998). 
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preferences of enacting coalitions.167  But there can be no doubt that rules 
review deemphasizes the preferences of enacting coalitions in favor of 
sitting ones.168  This makes it even less plausible to assume, as Chevron 
does, that ambiguity is a delegation to agencies.  A legislature that 
anticipates rules review does not anticipate that interpretative authority will 
be granted to an agency whose procedures work to implement the 
preferences of a previous legislature. 
Furthermore, when legislatures review rules, courts engage in judicial 
review only of rules acceptable to those sitting coalitions (because 
unacceptable ones will be voided).  Judges might therefore properly be 
inclined to be less deferential in determining whether a rule is consistent 
with a statute passed by an earlier legislature, in order to avoid giving 
sitting coalitions a too-powerful tool to impose their preferences without 
engaging in the ordinary process of legislation. 
The other variety of rules review, less ubiquitous in the states than 
legislative review but still fairly common, is rules review by the governor.  
In a number of states, agency rules cannot become effective without 
gubernatorial approval, or may be rescinded by the governor, sometimes in 
conjunction with a commission charged with review of rules.169  This 
arrangement bears a strong family resemblance to the institution of federal 
regulatory review in the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs 
(OIRA), part of the Executive Office of the President. 
The resemblance is particularly strong when gubernatorial rules review is 
twinned with requirements that governors conduct cost-benefit or other 
economic analyses of rules, OIRA-inspired requirements that are becoming 
more popular in the states.170  There are also, of course, many salient 
institutional differences.  For example, state statutes providing for 
gubernatorial review do not share the limitation that OIRA may review only 
―significant‖ rulemakings.171  They provide for a clear veto of rules, rather 
than a process of ―return‖ and delay.  Perhaps most important with respect 
to judicial review,172 gubernatorial review in some states is provided for by 
executive order, as is true for OIRA;173 in other states, however, it is 
provided for by statute.174 
 
 167. See McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, supra note 160, at 443–44. 
 168. This is true a fortiori in those states whose rules review procedures extend to already 
enacted rules. 
 169. See Woods & Baranowski, supra note 72, at 1220. 
 170. Cf. Edward Glaeser & Cass R. Sunstein, Moneyball for State Regulators, NAT‘L 
AFFAIRS (forthcoming) (advocating state-level OIRA-type review). 
 171. See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(b)(1), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993); see also 
Exec. Order No. 13,563 § 1(b), 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011) (reaffirming Exec. Order 
12,866); Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential Review, 126 HARV. L. 
REV. 1755, 1768–69 (2013) (recounting history of this provision). 
 172. See Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O‘Connell, The Lost World of Administrative 
Law, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1183 (2014) (―It is anomalous that [OIRA,] such an important 
feature of the regulatory state[,] has no statutory basis.‖). 
 173. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 65, at 146 (describing Florida); L. Harold Levinson, 
Legislative and Executive Veto of Rules in Administrative Agencies:  Models and 
Alternatives, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 79, 84–85 & n.25 (1982) (citing institutions for 
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Like OIRA, and also like legislative rules review, gubernatorial rules 
review raises various constitutional questions, which vary with particular 
arrangements.  But again like OIRA (and also like legislative rules review), 
where the institution operates, it is relevant to establishing the appropriate 
deference framework for judicial review of rules.  The debate over whether 
Chevron deference should apply to rules in which OIRA‘s handiwork is 
visible175 is roughly cognate to the issues raised by gubernatorial review in 
the states.  On the one hand, rules review outside the agency might be 
thought to undermine the Chevron assumption that ambiguity is a 
delegation to the agency.176  On the other hand, gubernatorial review 
strengthens the applicability of Chevron‘s notion that deference is justified 
by the political power of the executive:  ―While agencies are not directly 
accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely 
appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such policy 
choices‖177 necessary to resolve ambiguity, with appropriate regard to 
political considerations it views as relevant.178  In states where the statute 
empowers the governor to review rules, this latter argument may be 
somewhat stronger in the case of gubernatorial review than in that of OIRA; 
the statute creates quite clear political expectations about where the buck 
stops. 
The issue of the nonunitary executive, however, complicates the issue 
further in the states.  Gubernatorial rules review generally includes the 
power to review rules promulgated by agencies whose heads are 
independently elected.  Like the institution of the state attorney general, 
therefore, such review creates an intraexecutive check on agencies‘ 
interpretive power.  The implications of this for deference policy are 
muddled indeed.  Because any rule promulgated by an agency with an 
independently elected head has also received gubernatorial approval, tacit 
or explicit, one might imagine that a high level of judicial deference is 
appropriate, because the agency‘s interpretation has already been vetted by 
another political actor.  Judicial review, when it is the second review of 
agency action, might appropriately take particular pains to avoid deciding 
 
gubernatorial review in Arizona, Connecticut, Hawaii, Nebraska, and Wyoming).  The 1981 
MSAPA offers states the option of instituting gubernatorial review whereby governors may 
―rescind or suspend‖ any agency rule by executive order. See REVISED MODEL STATE ADMIN. 
PROCEDURE ACT § 3-202(a) (1981).  The 1981 MSAPA also permits governors similarly to 
―summarily terminate any pending rule-making proceeding by an executive order to that 
effect, stating therein the reasons for the action.‖ Id. § 3-202(b).  There are no cognate 
provisions in the 2010 MSAPA, which does not discuss gubernatorial review at all, 
notwithstanding detailed provisions for legislative review. 
 174. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 91-3(c) (West 2008); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 84-908 
(LexisNexis 2012). 
 175. See Farber & O‘Connell, supra note 172, at 1171–72; Shane, supra note 71, at 680. 
 176. See, e.g., Lisa Heinzerling, Statutory Interpretation in the Era of OIRA, 33 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1097, 1116 (2006) (―[T]he theoretical reasons for Chevron deference do 
not apply in a situation where an expert agency like EPA takes its interpretive directions 
from OIRA.‖). 
 177. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984). 
 178. See id.; Farber & O‘Connell, supra note 172, at 1172 (―[P]ortions of Chevron‘s 
reasoning seem to provide affirmative support for White House intervention.‖). 
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questions of ―policy.‖  On the other hand, as discussed below, gubernatorial 
review is like OIRA review and judicial review in creating a sequential 
game, where every rulemaking occurs in the shadow of the potential 
vetogates to come.179  Depending on the allocation of policy preferences 
and political needs within a plural executive, one can imagine situations in 
which gubernatorial review of rules promulgated by other elected executive 
officials could induce rulemaking outcomes less faithful to statutory intent 
than they would have been unencumbered by such review.180 
IV.   BUREAUCRATIC INSTITUTIONS 
Whatever the constitutional theory of Chevron, and however complex its 
relationship with the APA, there can be no doubt that one of its major 
justifications is the comparative institutional advantage enjoyed by agencies 
when interpreting the statutes that they administer.  Chevron urges 
deference in the situations where ―the force of the statutory policy in the 
given situation has depended upon more than ordinary knowledge 
respecting the matters subjected to agency regulations.‖181  One excellent 
reason to think that the Congress delegated to the EPA the task of 
interpreting the Clean Air Act is the latter‘s ―great expertise.‖182 
Of course, Chevron accords deference to all agencies, not just ―expert‖ 
ones.183  This reliance upon a generalization—many agencies have 
expertise relevant to statutory interpretation, so we should defer to all 
agencies‘ statutory interpretation—is properly controversial.  Sunstein 
argues that Chevron relies upon that generalization knowing it to be less 
than universal because simplicity is desirable given ―undeniable claims that 
specialized competence is often highly relevant.‖184  The suitability of 
Chevron to state administrative law depends, then, upon whether the 
generalization is generally accurate as to the states.  If, as Sunstein argues it 
might be, state agencies‘ expertise is generally dwarfed by their 
unreliability, bias, incompetence, and low visibility,185 then Chevron is not 
a policy that matches the states.186 
 
 179. See Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory 
State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1270 (2006); Nina A. Mendelson & Jonathan B. Wiener, 
Responding to Agency Avoidance of OIRA, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 447, 464 (2014); 
Nou, supra note 171, at 1757–58 (explicitly analogizing the strategic considerations created 
for agencies by presidential and judicial review). 
 180. A worked-out specification of this game would be of great interest but must be left 
to future work. 
 181. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. 
 182. Id. at 865. 
 183. See Shapiro & Fisher, supra note 8, at 476–81, 495 (delineating two different 
concepts of ―expertise,‖ one institutional and one deliberative and therefore contextual, and 
arguing that Chevron endorses the former). 
 184. Sunstein, supra note 11, at 2598. 
 185. Id. at 2596–97 & n.79. 
 186. Cf. Funk, supra note 54, at 172–73 (noting the argument that rationality review of 
state agency decisions might be inappropriate in light of state agency inexpertise, but 
concluding that ―[a]t the most, the difference in size, resources, and expertise between 
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Which is it?  Are state agencies in general properly characterized as 
expert, or are they closer to Sunstein‘s ―parallel world‖ of incompetent and 
untrustworthy regulators?187  The latter suspicion is not without 
justification.188  Politicians and political scientists through the 1960s 
dismissed state government as a backwater at best.  Jon Teaford catalogues 
representative thinking about the quality of state government in that period 
and finds this view to be the dominant one.  He quotes journalist Robert 
Allen‘s characterization of state government as ―the tawdriest, most 
incompetent and most stultifying unit of the nation‘s political structure,‖ 
characterized by ―[v]enality, open domination and manipulation by vested 
interests.‖189  This sounds a great deal like Sunstein‘s alternate regulatory 
universe.  Teaford then chronicles the rehabilitation of the states in the 
political science literature beginning in the 1970s;190 but academic lawyers 
and others continue to complain about the relative understaffing, 
underfunding, and low expertise of state as compared to federal agencies.191 
Teaford, on the other hand, argues for himself that states were never the 
backwaters that academic and political elites thought them to be, nor were 
they utterly transformed in the late twentieth century. He characterizes the 
development of state agencies in the early twentieth century as the ―transfer 
of power from elected local officials to expert state bureaucracies.‖192  State 
agencies took part in the technocratic, expertise-loving Progressivism of the 
early twentieth century just as federal ones did, Teaford claims.193  It is 
certainly true that complex and sophisticated state agencies confront 
statutory regimes and complex policy problems in areas like transportation, 
environmental quality, K–12 schooling, and higher education.  But even 
Teaford would agree, notwithstanding, that many other state agencies 
remain ―small, with little or no professional staff, and in some cases run on 
a part-time basis by persons whose primary jobs are elsewhere.‖194 
Overall, lawyers, political scientists and others writing in this area still 
tend to give the state regulatory apparatus less sustained attention than the 
political branches.  I therefore think it is fair to say that we do not know 
whether ―expert‖ is a fair characterization of state agencies in general.  It is 
a question that awaits more work. 
The place of state agencies in the federal system also vitiates the 
appropriateness of treating state agencies as expert in Chevron‘s sense of 
agency expertise.  This is especially true of those state agencies that are 
 
federal and state agencies . . . might call for some accommodation in the manner or ‗bite‘ of 
rationality review, but it does not require the abandonment of such review‖). 
 187. Sunstein, supra note 11, at 2596. 
 188. See Bruhl & Leib, supra note 48, at 1280; D. Zachary Hudson, A Case for Varying 
Interpretive Deference at the State Level, 119 YALE L.J. 373, 379 & n.24 (2009). 
 189. TEAFORD, supra note 78, at 2 (quoting ROBERT ALLEN, OUR SOVEREIGN STATE vii, 
xi–xii (1949)). 
 190. Id. at 4–5. 
 191. See, e.g., Funk, supra note 54, at 172. 
 192. TEAFORD, supra note 78, at 6. 
 193. Id. at 11–12. 
 194. Funk, supra note 54, at 168–69. 
2014] DEFERENCE IN STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 581 
concerned with complex policy area and so in some respects are the most 
likely to be characterized by bureaucratic expertise of the kind relevant to 
Chevron.  State officials who deal with the environment, education, or 
antiterrorism are enmeshed in a system of regulatory federalism195 that 
often very substantially deprives them of freedom of action.  State and local 
policymakers, constrained by the legal supremacy of their federal 
counterparts and the sometimes asphyxiating regulatory requirements 
associated with fiscal federalism and the administration of federal spending 
programs, often cannot freely exercise their expertise with respect to 
policy.196  Their routine dependence on federal funds reduces their freedom 
of action.197  Moreover, they can find themselves in an adversarial 
relationship with federal agencies,198 and they are at a disadvantage in the 
fight.  They therefore cannot be expert in the same way that federal 
agencies are.199  More specifically, in policy areas where regulatory 
responsibility is shared across federal and state levels and characterized by 
conflict, state agency statutory interpretation is likely to pay considerable 
attention to avoiding federal preemption, which poses a constant threat to 
state regulatory power.200  This environment of uncertain authority is one in 
which expertise in statutory interpretation is likely to be dominated by 
considerations of power and politics. 
Regulatory federalism can also function without conflict; but so-called 
cooperative federalism201 vitiates agencies‘ expertise in its own way, and 
their political accountability along with it.  State agencies may see 
themselves as clients or collaborators of their federal agency counterpart 
rather than part of a state administration accountable to the state political 
branches.202  Such agencies are inclined to defer to federal policymakers, 
who naturally seek consistency in their one-to-many relationship with the 
states.203  Such vertical, federal relationships may be more central to the 
agency‘s worldview and its fiscal and policy stability than its location in a 
hierarchy responsive to state political branches.  An agency with this kind 
 
 195. See Miriam Seifter, States, Agencies, and Legitimacy, 67 VAND. L. REV. 443, 456 
(2014). 
 196. See Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law As the New Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J. 
2023, 2075–76 (2008). 
 197. Cf. Brudney & Hebert, supra note 73, at 200 (dependence on federal funds insulates 
state agencies from influence by legislatures, governors, and other external actors). 
 198. See DONALD F. KETTL, THE REGULATION OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 12–14 (2d ed. 
1987). 
 199. Seifter also notes the converse problem, that states, ―naturally driven by their home-
state interests,‖ can undermine the ―expertise-based legitimacy‖ of federal administrative 
decisions. See Seifter, supra note 195, at 491. 
 200. See John Kincaid, From Cooperative to Coercive Federalism, 509 ANNALS AM. 
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 139, 144 (1990). 
 201. Id. at 140. 
 202. See Seifter, supra note 195, at 468, 475; James E. Skok, Federal Funds and State 
Legislatures:  Executive-Legislative Conflict in State Government, in STATE POLITICS AND 
THE NEW FEDERALISM:  READINGS AND COMMENTARY (Marilyn Gittell ed., 1986). 
 203. See Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737, 779–80 
(2004). 
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of multiple-master set of relationships across the federal system seems quite 
unlike the expert and linearly accountable agencies that Chevron posits.204 
CONCLUSION:  CHEVRON IN THE STATES 
As I show in Part I, unlike many federal administrative law doctrines, 
Chevron has been received spottily by the states.  Although a significant 
number of states have adopted deference doctrines that closely approximate 
Chevron‘s, few have endorsed it wholeheartedly.  Only a few have rejected 
it explicitly either, but the majority of the states have deference doctrines 
meaningfully different from Chevron‘s. 
In this Essay I have tried to show why this diversity is reasonable.  
Chevron is not generally a good fit for states.  Institutional differences 
between the states and the federal government (and, for that matter, among 
the states), although they do not matter a great deal with respect to many 
aspects of administrative law, are central with respect to administrative 
deference to agency action.  Chevron rests explicitly upon an institutional 
analysis.  Its holding rests upon thick knowledge of how legislation 
proceeds in the Congress, what shapes the President‘s executive power, 
how federal courts exert their authority, and the scope and diversity of 
federal rulemaking and adjudication.  All of these institutions are different 
in the states.  State judges are chosen and retained differently.205  The 
judicial power itself is different.206  Executive power is different too, 
distributed across multiple executives who have complicated and 
overlapping contact with agencies.207  Legislation is different.  The 
governing statutory regimes are different.208  And agencies themselves are 
different, arguably less expert and more ad hoc.209 
If we take Chevron at its word that an institutional analysis justifies its 
holding, then there is no clear case for applying that holding in the states.  
At a minimum, Chevron with its institutional reasoning offers no 
particularly good reasons to think that state courts should construe 
ambiguity in agency-empowering state legislation as delegations to state 
agencies.  Taken together, state/federal institutional differences suggest that 
Chevron does not offer a natural direction for state deference law.  The case 
that has so dramatically and fundamentally reshaped the federal system is a 
poor candidate for policy diffusion. 
 
 204. This problem is multiplied in the case of regional single-purpose agencies, whose 
masters are the state (sometimes states), various local jurisdictions, and other stakeholders, 
although it might be more accurate to characterize such agencies as having these entities as 
constituents but having hardly any ―master‖ at all.  These agencies are not always involved 
in rulemaking, but to the extent that they are, the proliferation of constituencies creates 
severe coordination problems, which may be an argument for deferential judicial review. See 
Liesbet Hooghe & Gary Marks, Unraveling the Central State, But How?  Types of Multi-
Level Governance, 97 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 233, 239–40 (2003). 
 205. See supra Part II.A. 
 206. See supra Part II.C. 
 207. See supra Part II.B. 
 208. See supra Part III. 
 209. See supra Part IV. 
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That Chevron‘s answer lacks an institutional justification in the states 
does not imply, however, that Chevron‘s question does not apply to the 
states.  It surely does.  The issue of judicial deference is vital in any modern 
regulatory state that authorizes both powerful agencies and judicial review.  
Every state court system has confronted this question.  What should state 
courts do when they review an agency action that relies upon an agency‘s 
reasonable, but arguably incorrect, interpretation of its authorizing statute, 
particularly in light of the institutional factors that I have described here? 
One thing it should certainly do is think institutionally.  Just as Chevron 
offers a federal doctrine of deference that is constitutionally sound, 
jurisprudentially defensible, statutorily consistent, and encouraging of 
effective public administration, so too must state deference doctrine 
embody these values.  Chevron is a model for states not by virtue of its 
holding but of its multi-institutional mode of analysis.  Just as Chevron 
asks, state courts should ask as well:  What do legislatures expect, or might 
they expect, when they draft ambiguous language?  How closely tied are 
agencies to elected members of the executive branch?  What actors in the 
system have what kinds of accountability?  What is the nature of the 
political safeguards that prevent or discourage agency overreach?  How 
much discretion will agencies generally have?  How much discretion do 
they need in order to be effective? 
It is a mistake for state courts to focus exclusively or primarily upon the 
judicial power, and the judicial duty to say what the law is, in thinking 
about the deference problem.210  As too few state courts seem to realize, 
judicial deference is not a matter of judges declining to say what the law is; 
it is a matter of how judges decide what the law is.211  And the answer to 
that question must be responsive to the full range of a state‘s constitutional 
institutions, to the design of its administrative code, and to the nature and 
missions of its bureaucracies. 
This Essay also suggests something about the content of state court 
deference rules.  One straightforward conclusion is that states need not 
reject Chevron.212  The particular way in which Chevron balances between 
politics, the rule of law, and bureaucratic effectiveness is a worthy model 
for states to consider.  Especially in those states whose institutional 
structures more closely resemble their federal counterparts—appointed, life-
tenured judges, relatively unitary executives, expert agencies—Chevron 
could well be a good fit.  And indeed many states have adopted Chevron or 
something like it.  Nothing I have said suggests that they are making a 
mistake.  It is not necessary for every aspect of Chevron‘s analysis to match 
state circumstances for it to be a useful model.213 
 
 210. See Sunstein, supra note 11, at 2610 (―The meaning of statutory enactments is no 
brooding omnipresence in the sky.‖). 
 211. But see Beermann, supra note 9, at 788–90. 
 212. Contra Hudson, supra note 188, at 380–81. 
 213. As I have noted, because Chevron is multivalent, it does not lose its appeal if, as 
many have argued, it is deficient in aspects of its analysis as applied to federal institutions. 
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A broader question is whether states should strive to set a deference rule 
at all.  Are institutional diversity and nuance reasons to tailor deference 
rules to each state‘s institutional circumstances, but then to apply the 
tailored rule within that state across the board?  Or should they be dominant 
considerations intrastate as well as across the states, so that state courts 
would tailor deference to the particular form of agency action at issue, the 
particular agency, the particular statute, or even the particular question 
presented?  If the latter, then states would adopt no deference rules, 
establishing at most only deference ―canons,‖ methodological 
predispositions that courts could use or disregard based upon their sense of 
each situation, and apply or not without fear of creating or violating 
methodological precedent with respect to deference in future cases.214 
As other contributors to this symposium make clear, this possibility is 
alive and well at the federal level, where scholars are pressing claims that 
Chevron in fact operates less as a rule in federal administrative law than as 
a canon irregularly applied—and that this is normatively appropriate or 
even desirable.  On this view, there should be no more ―methodological 
stare decisis‖ when it comes to judicial review of agency statutory 
interpretation than for any other form of statutory interpretation.215  Instead 
federal courts should ―tailor deference to variety.‖216 
Demurring to the merits of these positive and normative claims at the 
federal level, which are far outside the scope of this Essay, one might ask 
whether the institutional differences among states and between states‘ 
systems and the federal system ought to affect the outcome of these 
questions.  Is there anything about particularly state constitutional 
institutions, state administrative-law statutes, or state bureaucracies that 
urge greater methodological stare decisis, or greater ad-hocness, than would 
be appropriate at the federal level? 
I would point to two.  One is at the level of state courts, which are 
characterized by a higher level of methodological stare decisis with respect 
to interpretation than federal courts.217  The other is a point already made 
about state bureaucracies:  their expertise and quality is more variable than 
federal agencies‘.  If state agency action is already particularly prone to ad 
hoc and unsupportable decision-making, then clear rules of the road 
mitigate these problems, even at the level of generality associated with a 
deference rule.218  If an agency knows that it is entitled to deference of a 
 
 214. See Gluck, supra note 53, at 1761. 
 215. See Abbe R. Gluck, What 30 Years of Chevron Teach Us About the Rest of Statutory 
Interpretation, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 607, 612–13 (2014); accord Shane & Walker, supra 
note *, at 491. 
 216. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 236 (2001). 
 217. See Gluck, supra note 53, at 1754. 
 218. Clear deference rules can also be expected to mitigate statutory ambiguity at the 
state level. See Robert J. McGrath, Legislatures, Courts, and Statutory Control of the 
Bureaucracy Across the U.S. States, 13 ST. POL. & POL‘Y Q. 373, 374 (2013). 
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particular kind (including no deference at all), it actions are less ad hoc than 
when it is guessing as to what courts might do.219 
Of course, under a rule that courts review agency statutory interpretation 
de novo, agencies are already guessing; but at least they need not guess as 
to whether they should be guessing.  Anticipating de novo review, agencies 
can seek to bulletproof their claims and respond to all arguments; 
anticipating deference, they can seek to show reasonableness and emphasize 
their freedom to act under ambiguity.  But when deference is ―tailor[ed] to 
variety,‖220 the predictability of administrative action is less certain; and 
predictability is more badly needed at the state than at the federal level. 
Ultimately, however, the critical lesson is that states should not miss how 
involved, and how important, the deference question is.  Tailoring 
deference to variety cannot be allowed to slide into fudging the complexity 
of the deference issue.  State courts must think about their relevant 
institutions—all of them—when they decide whether to defer to agency 
judgment about what statutes mean.  In signaling the importance of that 
undertaking, Chevron offers a beacon even to those state courts that will, 
properly, choose to reject its holding. 
 
 
 219. Cf. Scalia, supra note 9, at 517 (―The legislative process becomes less of a sporting 
event when those supporting and opposing a particular disposition do not have to gamble 
upon whether, if they say nothing about it in the statute, the ultimate answer will be provided 
by the courts or rather by the Department of Labor.‖).  A parallel argument can be made 
about state legislatures‘ grants of powers to agencies under clear deference rules. 
 220. Mead, 533 U.S. at 236. 
